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INTRODUCTION
Understanding of the climate change phenomenon is relatively new. 1 Although
acceptance of the phenomenon is now widespread, there is no consensus over the
scope of each pollutant’s contribution to the problem and, even more so, an effective
response to the issue.2 Nevertheless, abundant scientific evidence shows that the

 J.D. Candidate 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. 2016,
Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank the entire Indiana Law Journal Board of Editors
for their hard work during the publication process. I would especially like to thank my family
for their love and support throughout law school.
1. Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. L.
REV. 1135, 1141 (2002) (“[G]lobal warming first entered the public consciousness in the late
1980s . . . .”); see also William W. Kellogg & Robert Schware, Society, Science and Climate
Change, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1076, 1078–79 (1982).
2. See Michelle S. Simon & William Pentland, Reliable Science: Overcoming Public
Doubts in the Climate Change Debate, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 224–
31 (2012); Brad Balukjian, Why Doesn’t Everyone Believe Humans Are Causing Climate
Change?, PBS: NOVA (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/climatechange-acceptance [https://perma.cc/N8WB-TJZU].
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“greenhouse effect” is caused by the release of greenhouse gases, most notably
carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, due to human activities. 3 Increased greenhouse gas
emissions cause Earth’s temperature to rise, destroying habitat and increasing the
scarcity of natural resources.4 The largest contributor to this problem is the air
pollution that results from the burning of fossil fuels. 5 Other by-products of fossil
fuels further impact human welfare, most of which are attributable specifically to the
burning of coal.6 This impact extends to include major health costs.7 Climate change
has advanced past the point of possible complete remediation, necessitating the
regulation of the costs that manifest themselves both socially and economically.
Many national governments have recognized and acted on the pressing need to
address and reduce the level of air pollution emitted by the world’s industry. It falls
to government to ensure that these costs are “accounted for in economic assessments
to avoid making irresponsible investment choices.”8 The classic way to account for
negative externalities, such as air pollution, is by implementing a “corrective tax.” 9
Such tax imposes additional costs on the polluter, which forces the firm to internalize
the cost. Ultimately, any emissions regulation is aimed at making clean air
alternatives more attractive and encouraging overall energy conservation. 10 The best
method of regulation may be disputed, but climate change is now recognized as a
public and political issue, as opposed to solely a scientific issue.11 Accordingly,
governments began playing a bigger role in climate policy in the late 1980s. 12 The
“transitional year” of 1988 marked the Toronto Conference and United Nations
General Assembly resolution on climate change, both of which recommended that
states develop their own framework to confront the dangers of global warming. 13
While climate policy is normally an item on the national political agenda, individual
states have recently become the focus and hoped-for origin of headway on climate
change policy.

3. E.g., FRANK P. INCROPERA, CLIMATE CHANGE: A WICKED PROBLEM 53 (2016) (“Since
the Industrial Revolution, both the concentration of CO2 and the rate at which it is increasing
exceed levels experienced at any time in the previous 2 million years. The carbon cycle has
become unbalanced.”); David Pearce, The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global
Warming, 101 ECON. J. 938, 938 (1991).
4. See INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 78.
5. Kellogg & Schware, supra note 1, at 1077.
6. Coal emits higher levels of carbon dioxide than other fossil fuels. See id. at 1083.
7. Such health impacts include premature deaths resulting from respiratory and
cardiovascular conditions caused by reduced air quality and rising healthcare costs. GLOB.
COMM’N ON THE ECON. & CLIMATE, THE SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IMPERATIVE:
FINANCING FOR BETTER GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 69 (2016); see also Donald B. Marron &
Eric J. Toder, Tax Policy Issues in Designing a Carbon Tax, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 563 (2014).
8. See GLOB. COMM’N ON THE ECON. & CLIMATE, supra note 7, at 70.
9. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Using Taxes to Improve Cap and Trade, Part I:
Distribution, 75 ST. TAX NOTES 99, 100 (2015).
10. E.g., Pearce, supra note 3, at 939.
11. See Daniel Bodansky, The History of the Global Climate Change Regime, in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 24–27 (Urs Luterbacher &
Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2001).
12. See id.
13. Id. at 25, 28.
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This Note uses two recent Massachusetts carbon tax proposals to discuss the costs
and benefits of such state-level climate change legislation but discusses similar
regional proposals as well. Although a state carbon tax poses some limitations and
concern for the increased tax burden relative to other states that have not imposed a
tax, the adoption of state carbon taxes represents an important advancement in
climate policy. Part I overviews legislative tactics used to combat climate change
thus far, including common policy responses, and the current attitude of federal
legislators toward the global climate crisis. Part II introduces the advantages and
common criticisms of a carbon tax policy and concludes that a carbon tax would be
an effective policy option. Next, Part III discusses recent state carbon tax proposals,
focusing on the efforts of northeastern states to enact the nation’s first carbon tax
law. Two Massachusetts proposals, Senate Bill 1821 and House Bill 1726, are
introduced to provide the basis for an analysis of state carbon taxes. Finally, Part IV
discusses the possibility of effective state-level climate change policy and analyzes
the costs and benefits of the Massachusetts state proposals. This Note argues that
states, especially population-dense states such as Massachusetts, should adopt statelevel carbon taxes to reduce their respective share of carbon emissions and supply
momentum to the climate change movement.
I. FIGHTING THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CRISIS WITH CLIMATE LEGISLATION
This Part outlines the policies typically proposed and utilized by politicians and
explains the attractiveness of these policies, most notably their status as nontax
options. These policy options, albeit more readily accepted by legislatures, have a
limited ability to influence consumer behavior thereby reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. This Part also briefly discusses past and present U.S. climate change
policy and obstacles to the passage of such legislation at the federal level, particularly
carbon taxes.
A. Policy Options
1. Cap-and-Trade Programs
Cap-and-trade programs are the preferred method of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by virtually all jurisdictions that have embraced climate change policy. 14
Reuven Avi-Yonah and David Uhlmann point out that the most promising proposals,
both in the United States and abroad, are market-based cap-and-trade systems. 15
Policymakers inclined to impose a price on emissions tend to already gravitate
toward nontax options, but a cap-and-trade program also fulfills the reduction goals

14. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change:
Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5 (2009) (discussing the popularity of cap-and-trade systems).
15. Id.; see also Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and
Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 207–08, 222 (2012) (explaining how the
U.S. delegation’s position to the Kyoto climate negotiations was central to the popularity of
cap and trade). The European Union has the most extensive cap-and-trade program to date,
involving thirty member countries and covering forty percent of all EU emissions. Id. at 223.
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of environmental advocates, introduces market incentives for industry, and complies
with economic principles of efficient pricing. 16
Under a cap-and-trade regime, the government determines the cap on total
emissions and distributes allowances, issued via permits, equal to this total.17
Businesses must then decide whether to use their allowances or sell them to another
firm for market price,18 however, there is a monetary incentive to reduce emissions
either way.19 Ann Carlson argues that cap and trade is best suited to the “temporal
and spatial fungibility” of greenhouse gases.20 Because the negative externalities are
not concentrated to the time and location at which they were emitted, firms can
“bank[] and borrow[]” allowances in the most cost-effective way.21 In another vein,
cap-and-trade systems are politically appealing to both legislators and businesses
because the allowances of such programs function as “legislatively created wealth.” 22
The ability to shape cap-and-trade programs to “create winners and losers” makes it
easier to gain political support, thus pushing it to a vote. 23
On the other hand, despite the ability to influence behavior to reduce emissions,
cap-and-trade systems present additional administrative burdens. For instance, there
is an inherent difficulty in setting emission-reduction targets. Regulators must also
implement oversight mechanisms to monitor emissions and allowance trades
between firms.24 This proves to be exceedingly difficult because these exchanges
“can take on layers of complexity that are susceptible to speculation and volatility.” 25
These allowance trades also challenge the level of price certainty any cap-and-trade
program is able to guarantee, making the cost of emission reductions somewhat
unpredictable.26 Furthermore, consumers still bear the ultimate cost of pricing carbon
through cap and trade. Taking California’s cap-and-trade regime, AB 32, for
instance, any reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would cause a corresponding
increase in gasoline, electricity, and industrial product prices.27
While cap-and-trade programs are currently the preferred approach by many
national and subnational governments across the globe, a superior cap-and-trade

16. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 14.
17. LEONARD E. BURMAN & JOEL SLEMROD, TAXES IN AMERICA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS
TO KNOW 13 (2013).
18. Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew Schein, Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade: A Critical
Review 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19338, 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19338.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGR3-HTC2]; see also Carlson,
supra note 15, at 209.
19. BURMAN & SLEMROD, supra note 17, at 13–14 (“If . . . the implicit tax due to the
market price of the permits, is equal to the social cost of the polluting activity, then decisionmakers are induced to take heed of the social cost of their actions.”).
20. Carlson, supra note 15, at 216.
21. Id. at 215–16.
22. SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO
EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 121 (2011).
23. Id.
24. Goulder & Schein, supra note 18, at 12.
25. INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 149.
26. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 14, at 6.
27. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 9, at 100–01.
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design would include “tax elements.”28 Mark Gergen, a proponent of state-level
legislation, has argued that a carbon tax should supplement a cap-and-trade
program.29 He proposes using two separate taxes to set the maximum and minimum
prices of allowances in a cap-and-trade system, a method he calls “wrapping a carbon
tax around cap and trade.”30 Requiring firms to purchase permits, rather than freely
distributing them, increases efficiency because firms will only acquire the necessary
number of allowances and no more. Firms must use their limited number of credits
to obtain allowances or otherwise pay a tax determined by the “wrap around” carbon
taxes. Crafty businesses will sort out the optimal configuration of redeeming credits,
but the incentive to use as few as possible is constant. Other commentators agree and
argue that it is easier to make the case for a more flexible hybrid cap-and-trade policy
that regulates permit prices with either a carbon price floor or ceiling (or both). 31
2. Command-and-Control Regulations
Through command-and-control regulations, the government mandates that firms
adopt a certain “pollution abatement technology” or sets a range of energy choices
for each source of greenhouse gas emissions. 32 These regulations may take the form
of renewable portfolio standards for power production, automobile-efficiency
standards, or other standards for buildings and appliances. 33 For instance, corporate
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards set efficiency standards for automobiles, 34
a larger source of emissions than the nation’s power plants. 35 This regulatory
approach provides lawmakers with additional nontax alternatives and is preferred by
those who would rather not guess as to the optimal quantity of greenhouse gases
given the economic cost of reducing the emissions. 36
The structure of command-and-control systems, while seemingly simple, limits
the potential reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that might otherwise be
achievable under a different policy option. These regulations provide polluters with

28. Id. at 99 (arguing that tax elements would make the California cap-and-trade regime
fairer to disadvantaged populations and mitigate negative effects on economic growth).
29. Mark P. Gergen, The Case in Economic Theory for Wrapping a Carbon Tax Around
Cap and Trade 2, 9–10 (Aug. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
30. Id. at 2.
31. Goulder & Schein, supra note 18, at 3; Luca Taschini, Simon Dietz & Naomi Hicks,
Grantham Research Inst. on Climate Change and the Env’t, Carbon Tax v Cap-and-Trade:
Which Is Better?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2013, 8:59 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/environment/2013/jan/31/carbon-tax-cap-and-trade [https://perma.cc/65C4-UEHR].
32. Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Behavioral Public Choice and the Carbon Tax, 2017 UTAH L.
REV. 115, 127.
33. See ROGER C. DOWER & MARY BETH ZIMMERMAN, WORLD RES. INST., THE RIGHT
CLIMATE FOR CARBON TAXES: CREATING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO PROTECT THE
ATMOSPHERE 1, 4 (1992); INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 148.
34. INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 148.
35. Hiroko Tabuchi, U.S. Climate Change Policy: Made in California, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/climate/california-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/A9VK-6C69].
36. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 9, at 100.
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no incentive to seek alternative, cheaper ways to reduce a particular source’s carbon
emissions past the required standard.37 Instead of continuing to innovate and search
for more efficient technologies or production methods, these regulations encourage
polluters to sit on their hands once reaching the minimum requirement.
The administrative burden of implementing and managing a command-andcontrol regime is also quite large. The government must identify the most
inexpensive ways to limit each source of carbon emissions. This requires massive
amounts of information that the government would have to collect anew. 38 The
government would also be responsible for establishing a system to monitor each
source’s ability to comply with these requirements. 39 Lastly, command-and-control
regulations are regressive in that the ultimate cost is passed down to consumers in
the form of higher prices for goods and services.40 For example, emissions standards
increase the price of cheaper vehicles, which are more likely to be purchased by lowincome households, by the same amount as more expensive vehicles.41 These
regulations, unlike carbon taxes, cannot self-correct because they generate no
revenue.42
3. Other Government Regulations and Subsidies
Governments have also used subsidy programs to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by incentivizing investment in low-carbon technologies and eco-friendly
goods.43 Congress has used tax credits, deductions, and shorter depreciation recovery
periods to encourage investment in alternative energy sources. 44 Specific examples
include “the income tax credit for hybrid cars and subsidies for corn-based ethanol,
the hydrogen fuel cell, and carbon sequestration technology.” 45 Although the public
highly favors subsidy programs as a climate change policy, some scholars believe
that they should not be more than a supplementary component of any government’s
climate policy.46 Nevertheless, green subsidies may stimulate technological
advancement and produce positive externalities in the form of reduced cost for
some.47

37. Lucas, supra note 32, at 127–28; see also DOWER & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 4.
38. Lucas, supra note 32, at 127.
39. DOWER & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 4.
40. Lucas, supra note 32, at 128.
41. IAN W.H. PARRY, HILARY SIGMAN, MARGARET WALLS & ROBERTON C. WILLIAMS III,
RES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE INCIDENCE OF POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES 16–17 (2005); see also
Lucas, supra note 32, at 128.
42. Lucas, supra note 32, at 128.
43. Id. at 129.
44. Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Darren A. Prum, States Taxing Carbon: Proposing
Flexibility and Harmonization in the Movement Toward Environmental Reform in the U.S.,
40 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 87, 102–03 (2017).
45. Lucas, supra note 32, at 129.
46. “[N]ot even the love-starved, benefit-distributing US Congress would take the
extreme position of relying only on subsidization as a climate policy.” HSU, supra note 22, at
121 (emphasis in original).
47. Michael Waggoner, Why and How to Tax Carbon, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 1, 32 (2008).
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On the other hand, subsidy programs pose significant economic efficiency issues.
As with command-and-control regulations, governments must rely on large amounts
of information that they do not readily possess to determine the activities that should
be subsidized.48 Furthermore, the sheer political attractiveness of subsidies functions
as a barrier to fulfilling the environmental objectives of such a policy. 49 Subsidies
attract the attention of special interests, causing the environmental considerations of
the program to be dwarfed by the objectives of self-interested lobbyists. Even more
fundamental, green subsidies are extremely expensive to sustain. 50 The combination
of high cost and possibility of negligible emission reductions makes subsidy
programs a less effective policy option both economically and environmentally.
B. United States Policy Toward Climate Change
Many economists and policymakers believe that successfully addressing global
climate change must come from the international community as a whole, 51 but this
has not dissuaded national or even subnational legislative bodies from enacting
climate change legislation. Throughout the twentieth century, U.S. energy and tax
policy has moved between encouraging energy conservation and favoring big oil and
gas.52 Nevertheless, the federal government has been active in climate policy for the
last few decades (with the exception of the Reagan administration), enacting several
excise taxes on fossil fuels and introducing tax credits for renewable energy. 53 More
recently, the Obama administration unsuccessfully attempted to get Congress to
adopt comprehensive climate change legislation, but nonetheless took steps to
commit the United States to more environmentally friendly policies. 54
Through the course of his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised
the repeal of many policies set by President Obama. 55 This included climate policy,
specifically aid to the United Nations Green Climate Fund and the Clean Power

48. Lucas, supra note 32, at 129; see also Kisska-Schulze & Prum, supra note 44, at 103.
49. See Lucas, supra note 32, at 129.
50. Id.
51. E.g., HSU, supra note 22, at 2, 5; Lucas, supra note 32, at 124 (“Climate change is a
global problem and addressing it will require global cooperation.”); Emily Richman, Note,
Emissions Trading and the Development Critique: Exposing the Threat to Developing
Countries, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 133, 133 (2003) (“A number of economists and legal
thinkers have asserted that an international emissions trading scheme is the most efficient way
to reduce the carbon emissions that cause climate change.”); see also supra text accompanying
notes 20–21.
52. Kisska-Schulze & Prum, supra note 44, at 101.
53. Id. at 101–02 (“One legal scholar asserts that the United States’ approach to use tax
policy as a pollution-reducing tool made it the world’s leader at the time.”).
54. Id. at 103; see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
55. See Trump Promise Tracker, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/graphics/politics/trump-promise-tracker/?utm_term=.b46ebb4732dc [https://perma.cc/E5KB
-E3M9] (last updated Sept. 17, 2018).
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Plan,56 which set limits on carbon emissions for each state’s power plants. 57 President
Donald Trump honored these campaign promises and began unwinding federal
involvement in climate change policy. Specific changes included rolling back
programs on vehicle fuel efficiency standards and groundwater protections and
proposing major budget cuts to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).58
President Trump has also filled many positions that exert influence over the direction
of U.S. climate policy with vocal climate change skeptics, most notably
Administrator of the EPA. 59 In June 2017, the Trump administration pulled the
United States out of the Paris Agreement, a global coalition assembled to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.60 This trend of opposition to federal climate change action
is mirrored by the legislature. For each effort to enact a federal carbon tax, “there
ha[s] been equal and parallel legislative endeavors to . . . curb climate action.” 61
The enactment of federal carbon taxes in particular faces certain political
difficulties, both directly from political opponents and indirectly from the biases of
voters. The coal and electricity industries’ political influence effectively serves as a
veto against any carbon tax proposal.62 On the voter side, there is a perception that

56. Ali Vitali, Trump Pulls U.S. Out of Paris Climate Agreement, NBC NEWS (June 1,
2017, 8:47 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-pulls-u-s-out-paris
-climate-agreement-n767066 [https://perma.cc/CP27-DDXN]; see also Rebecca Harrington,
President-Elect Donald Trump Doesn’t Believe in Climate Change. Here’s His Platform on
the Environment, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2016, 10:44 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com
/donald-trump-climate-change-global-warming-environment-policies-plans-platforms-2016
-10 [https://perma.cc/JEE4-Y2KJ].
57. Lucas, supra note 32, at 118.
58. Rebecca Gasper, Timeline: Trump’s 100 Days of Rollbacks to Climate Action, WORLD
RESOURCES INST. (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/timeline-trumps-100
-days-rollbacks-climate-action [https://perma.cc/2WAF-WRXL].
59. Shi-Ling Hsu, A Complete Analysis of Carbon Taxation: Considering the Revenue
Side, 65 BUFFALO L. REV. 857, 858 (2017). In July 2018, Scott Pruitt, Administrator of the
EPA, resigned amid allegations of legal and ethical scandal. Coral Davenport, Lisa Friedman
& Maggie Haberman, E.P.A. Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Under a Cloud of Ethics Scandals,
N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/scott-pruitt-epa
-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9M3X-GBR3].
60. Hsu, supra note 59, at 858–59. President Barack Obama had previously committed
the United States to lowering its emissions by twenty-six to twenty-eight percent. THE WHITE
HOUSE, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 2 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cap_progress_report_final_w_cover.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5SRQ-B6JP]; see also Chelsea Harvey, Defying Trump, These State Leaders Are Trying
to Impose Their Own Carbon Taxes, WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/12/defying-trump-these-state
-leaders-are-trying-to-impose-their-own-carbon-taxes/?utm_term=.063039c452b8 [https://
perma.cc/4RXD-VMP9].
61. Kisska-Schulze & Prum, supra note 44, at 104 (“Initiatives include the No Carbon
Tax Act of 2013 . . . and the American Energy Renaissance Act of 2015, which proposes to
amend the Clean Air Act to exclude GHGs from the definition of ‘air pollutant’ and to repeal
current rulemaking for carbon pollution standards for power plants.”).
62. HSU, supra note 22, at 120 (“While coal-heavy states such as West Virginia have
exerted pressure through their elected representatives, electricity-generating firms have
worked through one of the most powerful trade associations in the world, the Edison Electric
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energy usage is inelastic, which would make adjusting to a carbon tax nearly
impossible for low-income consumers’ budgets.63 Politicians have manipulated this
perception to advocate against such a tax. 64 There is also a perception of unequal
distribution across states, which hampers the political feasibility of carbon pricing. 65
These challenges persist even though several Republican officials have expressed a
preference for a carbon tax over other alternatives. 66
II. CARBON TAXES—THE BEST POLICY?
This Part focuses on the carbon tax as a climate change policy option. While the
previously discussed policies present certain limitations, a tax option would
eliminate efficiency and implementation concerns and allow for a broader societal
and environmental impact. The discussion covers four main aspects of the carbon
tax: superior economic efficiency, generation of revenue, regressiveness, and
practicality. The Part concludes that a carbon tax would be the most efficient climate
change policy option with the greatest positive environmental outcomes.
A. Economic Efficiency
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) determined a carbon tax to be the
most efficient among options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions.67 Most
economists agree that an optimal carbon tax, set as the marginal social cost of
emitting carbon, would create the most economically efficient reduction in activities
that produce carbon emissions.68 Ideally, the tax would be collected far upstream and
applied to a limited number of firms at the point the fossil fuel enters the economy,
such as the coal mine head, oil refinery, or wellhead. 69 After initial implementation
hurdles,70 focus on applying the tax to the gatekeepers of the stream of commerce
would allow the tax to be administered more simply. 71 It would also create a broad

Institute . . . .”).
63. Id. at 125–26.
64. Id. (debunking this argument against carbon taxes and asserting that low-income
individuals and households are able to find ways to substitute energy sources).
65. Roberton C. Williams III, Hal Gordon, Dallas Burtraw, Jared C. Carbone & Richard
D. Morgenstern, The Initial Incidence of a Carbon Tax Across U.S. States, 67 NAT’L TAX J.
807, 807–08 (2014).
66. Carbon tax options have also garnered support from prominent business leaders. Hsu,
supra note 59, at 860–61.
67. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS, at viii (2008),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/02-12-carbon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MF52-KXWD].
68. The optimal carbon tax can be determined through forecasts of damage caused by
global warming. Lucas, supra note 32, at 122; see also Marron & Toder, supra note 7, at 563.
69. INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 155.
70. See infra Section II.D.
71. “[C]ollecting the tax upstream would make it possible to accurately and cheaply cover
80% of U.S. emissions by collecting the tax at fewer than 3000 points . . . .” Gilbert E. Metcalf
& David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 501 (2009).
The gatekeepers, as the subject of the carbon tax, will adjust the price of their products and
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tax base with influence over each subsequent choice made by producers and
consumers. Polluters will adapt to use production methods that emit less carbon or
else pay the tax. Additionally, because the burning of fossil fuels will be taxed in
proportion to the carbon emitted, the consumption of coal, the largest emitter, will
be taxed most heavily, resulting in a reduction of not only carbon but also sulfur and
nitrogen oxides.72
Even when compared with a flexible cap-and-trade system, carbon taxes provide
more of a constant incentive to reduce emissions until they are eliminated. 73 This
incentive exists even if the cost of cutting emissions is higher or lower than the
expected cost.74 For example, an emissions cap would fail to incentivize firms to
further reduce emissions where new technology made it much cheaper to make their
reductions.75 But a carbon tax would supply an incentive as long as reduction costs
less than paying the tax. A steadily increasing carbon tax would “eliminate
fluctuations in the cost of emissions and allow both producers and consumers of
energy to more confidently determine when and to what extent emissions should be
reduced.”76 Carbon taxes provide another advantage that is left unresolved by capand-trade systems: price certainty. A carbon tax is fixed as a percentage of output
until further changed by the government. 77 This price certainty allows energy
producers to make smart long-term investment decisions and reduces the risk of such
investments.
B. Revenue
The revenue produced by a carbon tax is a major policy advantage that allows for
much broader economic and social impacts. Carbon taxes can either be revenue
positive or revenue neutral. There is debate about which mode is preferred,78 but each
design nevertheless presents revenue possibilities that other methods of climate
regulation do not. The revenue generated by a carbon tax allows for several viable
spending possibilities. For example, a revenue-neutral carbon tax can counteract its
regressive nature by redistributing the revenue in the form of a rebate check,
reduction in income or payroll taxes, or increase in the earned income tax credit. 79 In

services to account for the increased burden and pass on the cost to subsequent actors in the
production and consumption process. See id.
72. Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon Tax: The Introduction of the Carbon-Burned
Tax (CBT), 10 ULCA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 221, 232 (1992).
73. This incentive exists “as long as the marginal cost of abatement is less than the tax.”
Lucas, supra note 32, at 128.
74. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 67, at 4.
75. Id.
76. INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 154.
77. Yoram Margalioth, Tax Policy Analysis of Climate Change, 64 TAX L. REV. 63, 83
(2010).
78. Michelle Chen, How the States Can Still Fight Climate Change—Without the Federal
Government, NATION (June 2, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/states-can-still-fight
-climate-change-without-federal-government [https://perma.cc/76NY-ZGEY]; see also AviYonah & Uhlmann, supra note 14, at 32.
79. INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 151; Lucas, supra note 32, at 123–24; see also infra
Section II.C. Although rebates are politically attractive, they impose large costs. Lucas, supra
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these ways, the revenue can be used to maintain the desired level of overall
progressivity within the tax system. However, there is a tradeoff to utilizing the
revenue in such ways. Options most valuable to low-income taxpayers are much less
amenable to economic efficiency concerns because they do nothing to correct for the
“distortive effects of existing taxes.” 80 The CBO corroborates this sentiment and
asserts that some uses, such as reducing the deficit or cutting marginal tax rates, can
offset the economic costs while others, such as compensating groups adversely
affected by the tax, would not.81 On the other hand, economists believe that a
revenue-generating carbon tax is able to offset the burden it places on low-income
taxpayers and provide revenue for other purposes.82 Other potential uses of carbon
tax revenue include funding research and development to aid transition into a lowcarbon economy.83
Shi-Ling Hsu distinguishes between these options and argues that carbon tax
revenues are more than just economic.84 The choice over how to utilize the revenue
carries heavy social and political considerations as well. Some spending options
benefit the wealthy and others benefit low- and moderate-income households.85
Options such as reducing the personal or corporate income tax, for instance, are more
favorable to higher-income individuals because these taxpayers account for a larger
proportion of income tax revenue. 86 Reducing payroll or consumption taxes or
issuing lump sum rebates would directly aid low-income consumers.87 For this
reason, carbon tax revenue presents more of a struggle of competing values than
other taxes. Carbon tax advocates are forced to favor one group of taxpayers at the
expense of another regardless of whether they are advancing a revenue-neutral or
revenue-positive design. Simply choosing to direct revenue to the general treasury
might be enough to lose whatever popular support a carbon tax proposal may have.
C. Regressiveness
Carbon taxes increase the cost of fossil fuels to account for the social costs of
burning such fuels. This encourages energy conservation and the use of clean energy
alternatives that emit less negative environmental effects, however, there is a
downside. Any upward movement in energy prices caused by adding the social costs
to the price of fossil fuels has a larger negative impact on low- and middle-income
households. This is because low-income individuals and households devote a larger
fraction of their budget to energy costs than high-income households.88 Since low

note 32, at 124 n.36.
80. Marron & Toder, supra note 7, at 566.
81. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF A CARBON TAX ON THE ECONOMY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 2 (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013
-2014/reports/44223_Carbon_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9RP-KXE4].
82. Lucas, supra note 32, at 124; see also infra Section II.C.
83. Lucas, supra note 32, at 146.
84. Hsu, supra note 59, at 875.
85. Id. at 880–81.
86. Id. at 875–76, 880–81.
87. Id. at 877–78.
88. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN & ROURKE L. O’BRIEN, TAXING THE POOR: DOING
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energy prices are most beneficial to low-income consumers, low- and moderateincome households will feel most of the tax burden under any carbon tax or trading
system.89 Using data from 2003, Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach estimate that
a carbon tax would constitute 0.81% of the top decile’s annual income but 3.74% of
the bottom decile’s income.90 The carbon tax is most widely criticized for this modest
to high regressiveness.91
It is possible that the regressiveness of a carbon tax is not as extensive as
opponents assert and whatever level of regressiveness that does exist can be corrected
for through the use of supplementary policies. First, the level of regressiveness varies
depending on the measure of the tax burden used. Studies that examine energy costs
as a proportion of income show more dramatic effects on the poor than studies that
use an expenditure measure of incidence. 92 In their 2009 study, Kevin Hassett et al.
find that the burden on the bottom decile is 3.74% when measured as a proportion of
annual income but 1.16% of lifetime consumption.93 They suspect that this is partly
caused by “transitory income shocks” that “exacerbate the apparent regressivity”
when using the annual income measure.94 This makes carbon taxes appear more
regressive. Even though energy taxes cannot be deemed progressive, they place less
of a burden on the poor and middle class than much of the opposing rhetoric would
indicate.95
While the regressive quality of carbon taxes is real, no matter the disagreement
over its extent, there are measures available to counteract the unequal distribution of
negative side effects. As previously discussed, this may take the form of a rebate,
reduction in income taxes, or increased tax credit.96 According to Metcalf and
Weisbach, this should take the form of adjustments to the tax system itself rather
than adjustments to the design of the carbon tax. 97 Otherwise, the environmental

DAMAGE TO THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 62 (2011). The subject of Newman and O’Brien’s
study reported that she would not be able to afford an increase in her energy bill of just thirty
dollars. Id.
89. HSU, supra note 22, at 124; Tracey M. Roberts, Mitigating the Distributional Impacts
of Climate Change Policy, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209, 236, 239 (2010) (“The Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that the households in the lowest income quintile will
face approximately $700 per year in increased costs from climate change legislation that
reduces emissions by fifteen percent below projected levels.”).
90. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 71, at 513.
91. Id.
92. Kevin A. Hassett, Aparna Mathur & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Incidence of a U.S.
Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and Regional Analysis, 30 ENERGY J. 155, 156 (2009); James M.
Poterba, Tax Policy to Combat Global Warming: On Designing a Carbon Tax 7–9 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3649, 1991) (analyzing data produced by the
1985 U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey).
93. Hassett et al., supra note 92, at 162–65.
94. Id. at 165.
95. DOWER & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 22.
96. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
97. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 71, at 513–14 (recommending adjustments to the
income tax); see also supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
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incentives of the carbon tax become distorted because the carbon emissions would
no longer be priced equal to the marginal damages. 98
D. Practicality of Implementation
A carbon tax is the easiest climate policy option to implement and adjust.99 The
tax can be applied to a relatively small number of producers, which makes
administration easier to streamline. 100 It is also more stable once implemented and
less prone to political manipulation.101 However, there are initial administrative
hurdles that come with implementing the tax. First, the most socially and
economically efficient price is difficult to determine. The classic definition of a
carbon tax calls for a price equal to the marginal social cost,102 the estimation of
which is “complex, varied, and controversial.” 103 In a 2013 survey, the mean social
cost of carbon was determined to be $196 per ton with a standard deviation of
$322.104 But even though the exact carbon emissions of each source are difficult to
measure, the “volume and carbon content of fossil fuels burned” can serve as a
substitute.105 Furthermore, even a modest carbon tax can send the “right kind of price
signals” without the stress of determining the most optimal price.106
III. NORTHEASTERN STATE CARBON TAX PROPOSALS
The current direction of federal climate policy gives state and regional proposals
backing and possibility for success. Legislators in five northeastern states have
introduced bills to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the use of a carbon tax
or fee.107 The public opinions and political conditions of the northeastern United
States provide a strong basis for such proposals: the evidence of climate change is
widely accepted, states have adopted clean energy regulations, and states must
import fossil fuels.108 The northeastern states already participate in the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a regional cap-and-trade program that regulates
the electricity sector.109 A carbon tax would help these states reach their emission
reduction goals.

98. Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 71, at 513.
99. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 14, at 7.
100. INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 155.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
103. HSU, supra note 22, at 28; see also Marron & Toder, supra note 7, at 563.
104. Marron & Toder, supra note 7, at 563.
105. Christian, supra note 72, at 235–36.
106. HSU, supra note 22, at 29 (emphasis in original).
107. Such states include Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, and
Washington. Harvey, supra note 60. Voters in other states have argued for carbon-pricing
ballot measures. Chen, supra note 78.
108. Jan Ellen Spiegel, Northeastern States Moving on Carbon Pricing, YALE CLIMATE
CONNECTIONS (June 13, 2017), https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2017/06/northeastern
-states-moving-on-carbon-pricing [https://perma.cc/UE3B-JZ5K].
109. Id.; Janet E. Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States: The Context for the Future,
10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 26 (2008).
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The various carbon tax proposals diverge in important respects, including how to
use revenue, prices, and gradual price increases. For example, Vermont and
Massachusetts’s proposals both start at $10 per ton, but Vermont’s tax would
increase up to $100 while Massachusetts’s tax would only reach $40.110 Different
standards of living is one explanation for the price discrepancies, yet there are
concerns of increased competition among states. Nevertheless, the proposals would
be significant if adopted. This is especially true of the Massachusetts proposals
because the Rhode Island and Connecticut bills are contingent upon a carbon tax
being passed in Massachusetts.111
A. Massachusetts Carbon Tax Proposals
Two carbon tax proposals have been introduced in the Massachusetts state
legislature, one in the House and one in the Senate. If either bill is adopted,
Massachusetts will become home to the first carbon tax in the United States. The
northeastern United States generally presents a promising location to propose the
nation’s first carbon tax, but Massachusetts in particular harbors a hospitable social
and political environment for such legislation because the state leads the country both
“in energy efficiency and the size of its clean tech economy.”112 A state tax might
also be favored because it would help the Commonwealth achieve its target reduction
in emissions set by the Global Warming Solutions Act. 113 The proposals will be
introduced separately and their differences highlighted.
1. Senate Bill 1821
In early 2017, Massachusetts State Senator Michael Barrett introduced his third
carbon-pricing bill since 2013, Senate Bill 1821 “An Act Combating Climate
Change” (“S.1821”).114 The bill proposes a carbon tax of ten dollars per ton, rising
annually by five dollars until it reaches forty dollars. 115 The bill is a revenue-neutral
carbon tax proposal.116 The revenue, estimated to be between $350 and $400 million
in the first year of the tax, 117 is to be deposited into a “greenhouse gas emissions
charges rebate fund.”118 It would cover “reasonable administrative costs” associated

110. New York’s proposal would start at $35 and increase in increments of $15 until it
reaches $185. Spiegel, supra note 108.
111. The bills contain language that makes passage dependent on whether the
Massachusetts bill goes into effect. Harvey, supra note 60.
112. Mary Gable, With Two New Bills, Massachusetts Moves on Carbon Pricing,
CITIZENS’ CLIMATE LOBBY (Feb. 8, 2017), https://citizensclimatelobby.org/two-new-bills
-massachusetts-moves-carbon-pricing [https://perma.cc/ZK75-NEJV].
113. Carbon Pricing, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL MASS. CHAPTER, https://usgbcma
.org/advocacy-committee/carbon-pricing [https://perma.cc/RU5M-D8KL].
114. S. 1821, 190th Gen. Court, 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2017), https://malegislature
.gov/Bills/190/S1821 [https://perma.cc/QW45-2PQB].
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Carbon Pricing, supra note 113.
118. Mass. S. 1821.
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with the tax, with the rest being returned to households and businesses to minimize
the economic impacts.119 Residents would receive an equal rebate, but residents of
rural areas would receive additional compensation in the form of a “motor vehicle
fuel rebate” due to high transportation costs and lack of available substitutes. 120
Employers would be entitled to rebates based on their proportional share of statewide
employment, which is reassessed annually.121 This encourages businesses to employ
more full-time employees, as a greater company workforce will ensure a greater
return.122
Economists in support of this bill argue that this approach is cost effective. This
was reflected in the testimony of Professors of Economics Gilbert Metcalf and
Christopher Knittel given before the Joint Committee of Telecommunications,
Utilities and Energy (“Joint Committee”) at the public hearing held on June 20,
2017.123 The proposal provides a strong incentive to reduce consumption and allows
consumers discretion in deciding how to adjust to the tax. The proposed carbon tax
would also help the state continue compliance with RGGI and reach its target
reduction goals. After the sixth year of the tax, House and Senate committees would
assess whether any accommodations are to be made to the charges. 124
2. House Bill 1726
Representative Jennifer Benson sponsored House Bill 1726 entitled “An Act to
Promote Green Infrastructure, Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Create Jobs”
(“H.1726”).125 This bill proposes a carbon tax starting at twenty dollars per ton of
carbon emissions, increasing by five dollars until the rate is forty dollars. 126 H.1726
is a revenue-positive proposal.127 Eighty percent of the revenue is to be returned to
households and employers through rebates. 128 The remaining revenue would fund a
Green Infrastructure Fund (GIF) to “support investments in transportation, resiliency
and clean energy projects . . . prepare for climate change impacts, assist low-income
households and renters in reducing their energy costs, and create local economic
development and employment.”129 Eighty-five percent of GIF funds would be
distributed to municipalities to accomplish three prescribed purposes. 130 The plan

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Carbon Pricing and Utilities: Hearing Before the J. Comm. on Telecomms., Utils. &
Energy, 190TH GEN. CT. COMMONWEALTH MASS. (June 20, 2017), https://malegislature
.gov/Events/Hearings/Detail/2664/Video1 [https://perma.cc/9UKH-YWBU]. Gilbert Metcalf
has written extensively on what he considers to be an optimal carbon tax design. Metcalf &
Weisbach, supra note 71.
124. Mass. S. 1821.
125. H. 1726, 190th Gen. Court, 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2017), https://malegislature.gov
/Bills/190/H1726 [https://perma.cc/8UBS-QQ3T].
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. These purposes include the following: “(i) Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from

766

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:751

would allocate one-third of GIF funds to areas with income levels in the lowest third
of the statewide median income.131
H.1726 was discussed by the Joint Committee at its June 2017 public hearing.
Representative Jennifer Benson defended her revenue-positive bill and argued that
consumers who emit less carbon would receive a greater rebate, thus shaping
behaviors.132 The green fund would be able to finance new energy projects and
support collaboration among towns and municipalities.133 Other supporters present
at the hearing claimed that H.1726 is even attractive to rural constituents; there is a
thirty percent premium for residents who do not have alternative transportation. 134
IV. CAN STATE-LEVEL CARBON TAXES WORK?
The interaction of state and federal regulations presents challenges to effective
climate policy. For one, states have generally followed the lead of the federal
government and used the federal tax system to shape their own tax structures. 135
Although these similarities allow substantial benefits to states in terms of compliance
and administrative costs, federal policy “interfere[s] directly with states’ taxing
authority” and creates “spillover effects” into state policy possibilities. 136 For
example, states originally took the lead on environmental issues, but this changed
with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.137 However, it is still possible
for innovative state climate policies to influence future federal action.138 Considering
the likelihood that both federal and state legislatures will continue to regulate this
area, unilateral state policy has the potential to influence the national climate change
policy agenda.
In response to the federal government’s disfavor of proactive climate policy,
“grim news of rising temperatures, collapsing ice shelves, and massive flooding,” a
new sense of urgency toward climate policy has emerged.139 The states may be better
able to enact their own carbon laws with federal climate policy seemingly at an
impasse.140 In fact, the Carbon Tax Center issued a state-by-state analysis and opined
that carbon taxation could be an effective and feasible policy move for local

the transportation sector; (ii) Strengthen natural systems and harden critical infrastructure to
increase resiliency to climate change impacts; and (iii) Support municipal energy efficiency
and renewable energy projects that reduce emissions and costs.” Id.
131. Id.
132. Carbon Pricing and Utilities, supra note 123.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2594 (2005).
136. Id. at 2594–95.
137. Lawrence H. Goulder & Robert N. Stavins, Challenges from State-Federal
Interactions in US Climate Change Policy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 253 (2011).
138. Kisska-Schulze & Prum, supra note 44, at 105.
139. Hsu, supra note 59, at 859 (footnotes omitted).
140. Id. at 859–60 (arguing that it would be cheaper and more politically tactical to enact
a federal carbon tax); Chen, supra note 78 (“With the climate-change movement at an impasse
as the Paris climate treaty clashes with Trump’s anti-science agenda, the bottleneck around
carbon policy today is more political than technological.”).
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governments.141 The political challenges present at the federal level may pose less of
a barrier to enactment at the state level. The majority of state spending, for instance,
is attributed to education and social welfare programs; this spending presents a highly
acceptable use of revenue to the electorate.142
Several state and local governments have recently revived the idea of state-level
climate change legislation and made independent moves on climate policy. 143 Until
much more recently, state-level plans to reduce emissions have been businessfriendly cap-and-trade schemes.144 California adopted a program with the ambitious
goal of reducing overall emissions to year 1990 levels by 2020, “further reduc[ing]
emissions to eighty percent of 1990 levels by 2050.”145 Further, the California Air
Resources Board plays a large role in enforcing the Obama-era automobile emissions
standards.146
Most recently, Washington State balloted Initiative 732, which proposed a fifteen
dollar per ton carbon fee, set to steadily increase over the next few decades.147 In
2007, Boulder, Colorado, adopted a tax on the electricity sector that has reduced
emissions by 100,000 tons per year and generated $1.8 million in revenue. 148 The
city uses the revenue to issue rebates to businesses and homeowners and fund the
city’s climate action program.149 These state and local climate change initiatives
predate S.1821 and H.1726 but match the spirit and policy goals of the proposals.
They support the potential effectiveness of the bills in reducing emissions and

141. Chen, supra note 78.
142. Hsu, supra note 59, at 912–13.
143. See supra Part III.
144. Chen, supra note 78.
145. Carlson, supra note 15, at 227.
146. Tabuchi, supra note 35. Twelve states follow California’s standards. Id. Scott Pruitt,
the former Administrator of the EPA, had claimed that he would not try to revoke the federal
waiver that empowers California to take such a leadership role in automobile emissions
standards. Id. But see President Donald Trump, Remarks at American Center for Mobility
(Mar.
15,
2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office
/2017/03/15/remarks-president-trump-american-center-mobility-detroit-mi [https://perma.cc
/PD2F-C5CQ]. However, the Trump administration announced in April 2018 that it would be
revoking California’s waiver and amending Obama-era fuel efficiency standards. Natasha
Geiling, EPA Plans to End California’s Fuel Economy Waiver Despite Pruitt’s Claims to the
Contrary, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 27, 2018, 3:06 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/epa-endcalifornia-waiver-freeze-fuel-economy-standards-2020-ea5ac66b8fed
[https://perma.cc
/T5SL-M36S].
147. Initiative 732 (“I-732”) was designed to be revenue neutral. The carbon tax proposal
included reductions in other sources of state revenue, most notably the state sales tax.
Opponents argued that I-732 would cost the state money while supporters claimed that it
would allow low-income taxpayers to keep more of their tax dollars. Chelsea Harvey, It Could
Be the Nation’s First Carbon Tax. And Environmentalists Are Fighting over It, WASH. POST
(Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/10/17
/it-could-be-the-nations-first-carbon-tax-and-environmentalists-are-fighting-over-it/?utm
_term=.51316a9c5a9a [https://perma.cc/GZ64-22E3].
148. Naveena Sadasivam, How Boulder Taxed Its Way to a Climate-Friendlier Future,
INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 2, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/02112015/boulder
-taxed-its-way-climate-friendlier-future [https://perma.cc/W95L-FKBX].
149. Id.
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represent a step forward in obtaining a more prominent place for the issue on the
national policy agenda.
This Part discusses the potential advantages and disadvantages of the
Massachusetts carbon tax proposals from an economic, cultural, and social
perspective. There are strong economic arguments on both sides of the state carbon
tax debate, but the political and cultural significance of a state-level tax would
nonetheless be extraordinary. Additionally, the resulting reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions would cause corresponding improvements in air quality and, however
modest, the environment itself. In light of the available climate policy options and
the effectiveness of the carbon tax, this Part evaluates S.1821 and H.1726 and argues
that the balance between the benefits and costs of a state carbon tax weigh in favor
of passing such a bill.
A. Impact on State Economies & Cultures
Even though such policies would be best implemented on a national level, 150
unilateral state action presents positive possibilities for the future of climate change
legislation. The price-based quality of the carbon tax, as exemplified by both
proposed carbon taxes discussed in this Note, allows state carbon taxes to work
harmoniously with federal policy, should it ever be enacted. Lawrence Goulder and
Robert Stavins identify possible problematic interactions between federal and state
quantity-based climate regulations but find no comparable issues with price-based
regulations.151 Although concern for business presents a persuasive reason to
carefully consider state-level climate legislation, this Section will discuss ways in
which the Massachusetts economy stands to see possible positive impacts from the
current carbon tax proposals.
For one, the Massachusetts carbon tax proposals are modest enough to be an
attractive economic and fiscal policy option. S.1821 proposes a gradually increasing
carbon tax starting at ten dollars.152 This increases the price of fossil fuel
consumption by roughly 2.4% for residential customers and 4% for industrial
customers.153 In December 2014, a study entitled Analysis of a Carbon Fee or Tax
as a Mechanism to Reduce GHG Emissions in Massachusetts (the “Analysis”)154
found that a revenue-neutral graduated tax on major sources of carbon emissions
would “result in positive impacts on Massachusetts’ economic and employment

150. Dale W. Jorgenson, Daniel T. Slesnick & Peter J. Wilcoxen, Carbon Taxes and
Economic Welfare, 1992 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 393, 394
(“The design of an appropriate level for carbon taxes would involve international coordination
and consideration of interactions among different tax and expenditure programs within each
nation.”); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
151. Goulder & Stavins, supra note 137, at 256.
152. S. 1821, 190th Gen. Court, 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2017), https://malegislature
.gov/Bills/190/S1821 [https://perma.cc/QW45-2PQB].
153. Frank Muller & J. Andrew Hoerner, Greening State Energy Taxes: Carbon Taxes for
Revenue and the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 5, 18 (1994).
154. MARC BRESLOW, SONIA HAMEL, PATRICK LUCKOW & SCOTT NYSTROM, ANALYSIS OF
A CARBON FEE OR TAX AS A MECHANISM TO REDUCE GHG EMISSIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS 76
(2014) (concluding that a flat rebate is more equitable than reducing state tax rates).
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sectors while reducing CO2 emissions by five to ten percent.”155 This was echoed in
arguments at the public hearing in front of the Joint Committee, many of which were
made in general support of carbon pricing and not directly in favor of a specific
proposal. Representative Solomon Goldstein-Rose claimed that a carbon bill would
allow Massachusetts to develop and patent cheap energy technologies: “[T]he most
significant benefit of carbon pricing is that it will create a market environment in
Massachusetts that will drive a demand for cheap, clean energy and attract companies
to move [to Massachusetts] to commercialize their new technologies.”156 Due to the
fledgling state of the clean energy economy, a state carbon tax would encourage
consumers to seek alternative sources of energy, potentially attracting new business
to the state to fulfill the new demand.
It is also important to note that although most states in the Northeast have voiced
interest in adopting state carbon taxes, unilateral state action presents possible
disadvantages in the realm of business competition. A state carbon tax would cause
the price of exports from the taxing state to be much more expensive relative to
imports from other states. 157 Thus, the products subject to the state tax will be less
attractive to both the export market and in-state consumers.158 The taxing state, acting
on its own, is trying to correct for externalities that are not confined to its own
borders. This tempts neighboring states to free ride on the effects of a carbon tax
imposed within another state. 159 In fact, Rhode Island and Connecticut’s proposals
are tied to the success of the Massachusetts bills for exactly this reason. 160
The Massachusetts carbon tax proposals also have an employer incentive to
encourage the creation of new jobs, thus strengthening the state economy. Under
both S.1821 and H.1726, employer rebates are issued according to the firm’s number
of full-time employees, which will encourage firms to expand and invest in labor.161
However, the CBO finds that the carbon tax would reduce real wages, having a
corresponding reduction on the available labor supply. 162 While the economic
advantages of adopting a carbon tax in the context of such a developing industry may
be exaggerated, Massachusetts’s actions would still send powerful signals to
neighboring states. Rhode Island Representative Aaron Regunberg’s testimony at the
Joint Committee hearing spoke to his state’s reliance on Massachusetts policy,
which, he claimed, has a “ripple effect” on the entire region. 163
A Massachusetts carbon tax would also have positive cultural impacts with the
potential to influence federal policy. For instance, the tax implemented by Boulder,

155. Kisska-Schulze & Prum, supra note 44, at 109–10.
156. Carbon Pricing and Utilities, supra note 123.
157. Darien Shanske, State-Level Carbon Taxes and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Can
Formulary Apportionment Save the World?, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 191, 193–94 (2014) (following
the carbon tax design proposed by Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach).
158. Id. at 194.
159. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
160. Harvey, supra note 60.
161. S. 1821, 190th Gen. Court, 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2017), https://malegislature.gov
/Bills/190/S1821 [https://perma.cc/QW45-2PQB]; H. 1726, 190th Gen. Court, 1st Ann. Sess.
(Mass. 2017), https://malegislature.gov/Bills/190/H1726 [https://perma.cc/8UBS-QQ3T].
162. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 81, at 1, 6.
163. Carbon Pricing and Utilities, supra note 123.
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Colorado, allows the city to maintain interest in the issues of climate change, energy,
and overall community conservation. 164 Massachusetts, as a population-dense
jurisdiction already motivated to politicize climate change, 165 has the ability to
provide the model for state-level climate change legislation. The economic benefits,
while admittedly uncertain to a point, would be highlighted by the legal and political
benefits of implementing a state carbon tax and advocating for similarly-minded
states to do the same.
B. Distribution of Incidences
Generally, states and localities have more regressive tax systems, 166 the level of
which varies widely across states and regions.167 These variances extend to energy
taxes. Energy production, consumption, and cost differ across regions, so some areas
will bear higher tax burdens than others. 168 Tracey Roberts finds that different
regions as a whole experience similar incidences, “but low-income residents in the
Northeast, the Ohio Valley, and Florida will be more heavily impacted by a carbon
tax . . . due to home heating and electricity costs.” 169 However, more recent studies
have determined that “[t]here is little variation across regions,” and any difference
that may exist is “at best modest.”170 Kevin Hassett et al. show that these variances
reached a highpoint in 1997 but fell under one-half of a percentage point by 2003.171
The study, in fact, acknowledges these results as surprising “given the variation in
weather conditions and driving patterns across the regions.” 172 But these results are
explained when the differences in the consumption of fossil fuels across regions are
examined. For example, home heating oil is consumed in higher volumes in New
England, gas in the East North Central region, and electricity in the West South
Central.173 The different combinations of fuel usage equate to more similar totals. 174

164. Sadasivam, supra note 148; see also supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.
166. Patricia Cohen, Study Finds Local Taxes Hit Lower Wage Earners Harder, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/business/local-taxes-hit-lower
-wage-earners-harder-study-finds.html [https://perma.cc/7HCW-3UVN].
167. Zhiyong An, Regressive State Tax Systems: Facts, Several Possible Explanations, and
Empirical Evidence, in 101 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N & MINUTES ANN. MEETING NAT’L
TAX ASS’N 14, 14 (2008).
168. DOWER & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 22–24. Regional effects are measured in two
ways: “energy expenditures by households in the region” and “indirect . . . effects[] of the tax
on a region’s industrial activity, employment, and wealth.” Id.
169. Roberts, supra note 89, at 238. Contra Williams et al., supra note 65, at 817 (“The
lightest burdens are in the Pacific coast and the relatively urban states on the East Coast (from
Massachusetts to Washington, DC).”).
170. Hassett et al., supra note 92, at 157, 166 (reporting the average carbon tax paid by
consumers across different regions).
171. Id. at 165–66.
172. Id. at 165. Contra Roberts, supra note 89, at 238.
173. Hassett et al., supra note 92, at 165.
174. Id. at 166 (calculating the average ratio of carbon tax burdens to income for each
region). The regional burdens fall between 1.92 and 1.47, with 1.62 as the median. Id.
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The incidences resulting from the implementation of S.1821 or H.1726 are not an
overwhelmingly persuasive argument for rejecting either carbon tax proposal. The
2014 Analysis found that low- and moderate-income Massachusetts households in
the first, second, and third quintiles would experience a net gain or come out even
under a carbon tax that distributes rebates either per person or per household. 175
Williams et al. echoed this finding for states across the Northeast: electricity prices
in “California, the Northwest, and the Northeast are the least affected.”176 However,
the Analysis did determine that “a per-person rebate, or a mixed system, would be
more equitable than a per household rebate.”177 The adverse effects of a tax on certain
groups are an important consideration when debating a tax proposal, but these
concerns should not automatically block the passage of either bill.
C. Miscellaneous Savings
The reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would translate into positive health
benefits and savings in healthcare costs. Few studies have focused on state-level
outcomes for state-level carbon bills, but the Center for Health and the Global
Environment at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health conducted a study into
the “health co-benefits” that might result from the air quality improvements effected
by S.1821 and H.1726.178 The researchers built a model based on the “results of an
economic model of the fuel use and carbon emissions reductions . . . health impact
functions from the scientific literature . . . and standard health benefit valuation
metrics.”179 The study concluded that the bills would save lives, reduce the
occurrence of heart attacks, decrease hospitalizations due to cardiovascular and
respiratory diseases, and save $2.9 billion in healthcare costs over the next twentythree years.180 If the health benefits from a single state carbon tax stand to be so
significant, multiple state laws would have a profound effect on public health.
The reduction in greenhouse gases resulting from the carbon tax would also offer
benefits on the condition of the ecosystem itself. While the Massachusetts air quality
study was focused on the health benefits of the carbon tax proposals, it also reported
potential benefits to “crop productivity, farming, forestry, and reductions in acid

175. BRESLOW ET AL., supra note 154, at 4–5, 46–48 (analyzing the effects of a revenueneutral state carbon tax).
176. Williams et al., supra note 65, at 820 (emphasis added).
177. BRESLOW ET AL., supra note 154, at 4–5.
178. Projected Health Benefits of Mass. Carbon Fee-and-Rebate Bill Explored, HARV.
T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-the-news
/massachusetts-carbon-bill-health-benefits [https://perma.cc/C4BT-396K].
179. JONATHAN J. BUONOCORE, RENZO R. GUINTO, JONATHAN I. LEVY, SCOTT NYSTROM,
CHRIS BROWN & AARON S. BERNSTEIN, AIR QUALITY AND HEALTH CO-BENEFITS OF A CARBON
FEE-AND-REBATE BILL IN MASSACHUSETTS 2 (2017), http://chge.hsph.harvard.edu/files
/chge/files/carbonfeema.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD58-T4VD].
180. Id. at 2–3; see also Shira Schoenberg, Massachusetts Carbon Fee Would Save $2.9
Billion in Health Costs over Two Decades, Study Finds, MASSLIVE (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/04/study_quantifies_health_benefi.html
[https://perma.cc/8UZE-CLHM].
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rain.”181 Air pollutants contribute directly to the production of smog and acid rain,
which not only forces residents to breathe in dangerous chemicals but also dampens
crop and timber productivity.182 A carbon tax would also have a two-fold effect on
traffic and infrastructure issues. For one, the revenue from a revenue-positive
proposal like H.1726 could fund transportation projects. A carbon tax, regardless of
revenue use, would also encourage commuters to take advantage of public
transportation, reducing congestion and the amount of vehicle emissions released
into the atmosphere.
CONCLUSION
With the slight if not dismal possibility of imminent federal action on the issue of
climate change, the states have the opportunity to play a major role in the area. States
have several policy options to choose from, but the carbon tax has proven to be
perhaps the most effective and efficient mechanism by which to curb carbon
emissions. With the creation of a broad tax base, a state-level carbon tax can not only
correct for issues such as regressiveness and competition between neighboring states
but also further encourage collaboration on clean energy projects and technologies.
The Northeast is the most promising region for such a tax in the United States, and
Massachusetts presents a particularly favorable social and political climate for a state
carbon tax. Accordingly, two proposals have been introduced to the Massachusetts
Senate and House, S.1821 and H.1726.183 The bills diverge in the use of revenue, one
being revenue neutral and the other revenue positive, respectively. However, the
proposals further many of the same policy goals and would reach similar results.
While the actual economic prospects under such a tax are hardly definitive, it is
possible to support a state carbon tax under many different policy objectives. The
increased price of carbon emissions would encourage investment in clean energy
technologies and potentially attract new businesses to fill the demand for alternative
energy sources. The rebates issued to households and employers under both tax plans
counteract the regressiveness and incentivize the creation of new jobs in the state. As
a collateral benefit, a state carbon tax would also impact the political and cultural
scene by keeping the climate change issue fresh and potentially influencing federal
policymakers. The passage of a carbon tax in Massachusetts, or any state for that
matter, would be remarkable. It would represent an important step forward in
addressing the climate change crisis and hopefully be the start of more proactive
government action in the area.

181. BUONOCORE ET AL., supra note 179, at 3, 5.
182. Id.
183. See supra Section III.A.

